Conflict and Production: An Application to Natural Resources
AbstractWe present a Stackelberg model of conflict, in which contestants have limited endowments to be put in two separate sectors, thus incorporating salient features of many conflicts. The model is applied to the case of conflict over natural resources. Consistent with amounting empirical evidence regarding a so-called "resource curse", we find that the relation between conflict intensity and resource rents is non-monotonous, and that the economy's income growth rate may be negatively affected by resource abundance. --
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics in its series Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 with number 34.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Resource curse; exhaustible resources; civil war; economic performance and resources;
Other versions of this item:
- Wick Katharina, 2008. "Conflict and Production: An Application to Natural Resources," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-47, January.
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2007-12-01 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2007-12-01 (Development)
- NEP-ENE-2007-12-01 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2007-12-01 (Environmental Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Antonio Cabrales & Esther Hauk, 2011.
"The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(551), pages 58-88, March.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Hauk, Esther, 2010. "The quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/12989, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Mare Sarr & Katharina Wick, 2010. "Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 183-205, April.
- Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009.
"Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
[ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION O," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Wick, A.K., 2008. "Conflicts, Development and Natural Resources: An Applied Game Theoretic Approach," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3160797, Tilburg University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.