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Vorstandsvergütung in Deutschland - ist eine Trendwende in Sicht?


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  • Koch, Rosemarie
  • Raible, Karl-Friedrich
  • Stadtmann, Georg
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    In diesem Aufsatz untersuchen wir das Wachstum der Vorstandsvergütung in den vergangenen 15 Jahren und stellen uns die Frage, wie sich die Vorstandsvergütung in der Zukunft entwickeln könnte. Wir vermuten, dass die Einführung von Long-Term-Incentives (LTI) in Form von Aktienoptionsplänen, die erst nach Erlass des KonTraG im Jahre 1998 technisch einfach möglich waren, einen Grund für die großen Zuwachsraten darstellen. In einer empirischen Untersuchung analysieren wir die Vorstandsvergütung von DAX- und MDAX-Unternehmen in Bezug auf die LTIs. Wir stellen fest, dass 2009 78 % aller betrachteten Unternehmen einen LTI gewährten. Dieser machte 2009 durchschnittlich 20 % der Gesamtvergütung aus, während die Short-Term-Incentives (STI) mit rund 40 % immer noch die größte Vergütungskomponente darstellten. Die beliebtesten Formen zur Ausgestaltung des LTI waren Aktienoptionspläne und virtuelle Aktienoptionen, wobei die klassischen Aktienoptionspläne in den betrachteten vier Jahren an Gewicht verloren. Dies weist darauf hin, dass es in Bezug auf die zukünftige Entwicklung eine Trendwende geben könnte. Das im August 2009 erlassene Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) wird diese Entwicklung nach unserer Erwartung noch beschleunigen. -- We examine German stock corporations' executive compensation's growth over the last 15 years. Furthermore, we investigate how executive compensation might develop in the future. Over the past 15 years we observe dynamic growth of executive compensation especially in large stock corporations such as those listed in the DAX and MDAX indices. We assume that one reason for these high growth rates in the past is the introduction of long-term incentives which has been technically easily implementable since the passing of the control and transparency business act in the year 1998. In an empirical analysis we explore executive compensation of companies listed in DAX or MDAX with regards to usage and arrangement of long-term incentives. While short-term incentives still represent the largest share of executive compensation constituting 40 % of total compensation, long-term incentives on average made up for 20 % of total compensation in 2009. The most popular forms of longterm incentives are stock option programs and stock appreciation rights. However, during the four years analyzed the classical stock option programs significantly lost importance. This alludes to an upcoming trend reversal in executive compensation. In our view the law on the adequacy of executive compensation passed in August 2009 will further speed up this future development.

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    Paper provided by European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 299.

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    Date of creation: 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:299

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    Keywords: Vorstandsvergütung; Wachstum; Aktienoptionen; Long-Term-Incentive; VorstAG; Trendwende; Executive Compensation; Growth; Stock Options; Long-Term Incentive; Law on Adequacy of Executive Compensation; Trend Reversal;

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    Cited by:
    1. Duran, Mihael, 2011. "Nachträgliche Reduktion von Vorstandsbezügen: Eine ökonomische Analyse der Herabsetzungsmöglichkeit von Vorstandsbezügen nach dem VorstAG
      [Ex post Reduction of Executive Compensation: An economic r
      ," MPRA Paper 33815, University Library of Munich, Germany.


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