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Internationalisation of banking and banking supervision

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  • Speyer, Bernhard
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    Abstract

    The divergence between increasingly supranational financial markets on the one hand and still largely national supervisory structures on the other gives rise to tensions which reduce the effectiveness of the supervision. It lies in the interests of both the public and the private sector that the supervisory structures are commensurate with the risks in a global capital market. An extension of the framework of common minimum standards (at a high level!) and joint definitions and data standards are just as essential as an intensification of cooperation among the supervisory authorities. Self-regulation, market discipline and the inclusion of the financial industry in the shaping of the rules should be obvious elements of a modern supervisory regime. Banks which operate internationally see themselves caught between national regulation and cross-border activity every day. The combination of different sets of rules and supervisory authorities is a major cost factor and hinders the integration of the markets. The co-existence of national authorities operating in parallel risks violates the principle of competitive neutrality of supervision in a single market. This certainly applies in the EU, where not only internationalisation, but supranationalisation of supervision is called for. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Deutsche Bank Research in its series Research Notes with number 01-7.

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    Date of creation: 2001
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:dbrrns:017

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    Cited by:
    1. Aerdt Houben & Iskander Schrijvers & Tim Willems, 2008. "The Supervision of Banks in Europe: The Case for a Tailor-made Set-up," DNB Occasional Studies 604, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    2. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Schüler, 2004. "A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 99-130, October.
    3. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "How Do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-03, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    4. Stéphanie Stolz, 2002. "Banking Supervision in Integrated Financial Markets: Implications for the EU," CESifo Working Paper Series 812, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision: The European Case," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Heinemann, Friedrich & Schüler, Martin, 2002. "A Stigler View on Banking Supervision," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-66, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

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