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Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision: The European Case

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  • Schüler, Martin
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    Abstract

    This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may pursue private interests. Incomplete information, insufficient accountability of the agent and lack of enforceability of compliance result in an incentive problem. A reform of the European supervisory system complemented by strengthening market discipline based on improved disclosure of both the supervisor and the banks may help to solve the European incentive problem. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 03-62.

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    Date of creation: 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:1492

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    Keywords: banking regulation and supervision; principal-agent; European Union;

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    References

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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Sándor Gardó, 2010. "Bank Governance and Financial Stability in CESEE: A Review of the Literature," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 1, pages 6-31.
    2. Edward J. Kane, 2005. "Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements," NBER Working Papers 11865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. D'Hulster, Katia, 2011. "Cross border banking supervision : incentive conflicts in supervisory information sharing between home and host supervisors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5871, The World Bank.
    4. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    5. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    6. Masciandaro, Donato & Pansini, Rosaria Vega & Quintyn, Marc, 2013. "The economic crisis: Did supervision architecture and governance matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 578-596.
    7. Christoph Walkner & Jean-Pierre Raes, 2005. "Integration and consolidation in EU banking - an unfinished business," European Economy - Economic Papers, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission 226, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.

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