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Mitbestimmung als Schutz für Quasirenten


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  • Kirstein, Roland


Die gesetzlichen Regelungen zur betrieblichen Mitbestimmung räumen Arbeitnehmer umfangreiche Mitwirkungs- und Kontrollrechte ein. Diese Ausdünnung der Eigentumsrechte an Unternehmen ist nicht zwangsläufig ineffizient. Mitbestimmung kann auch als Sicherungsmechanismus gegen opportunistische Ausnutzung spezifischer Ausbildungsinvestitionen der Arbeitnehmer gesehen werden. Im Sinne einer konstitutionellen Selbstbindung hätten dann sogar die Arbeitgeber selber ein Interesse an der Einführung der Mitbestimmung. Das Paper diskutiert vier Spiele, die sich danach unterscheiden, ob es die Arbeitnehmer oder die Arbeitgeber sind, die zunächst über die Einführung der Mitbestimmung entscheiden und später die Kosten der Mitbestimmung tragen. Dabei zeigt sich, daß es sinnvoll sein kann, die Einführungsentscheidung von der Kostentraglast zu trennen. -- The laws on codetermination in Germany provide enormous rights for employees to control and influence the decisions of firms. This weakens the owenrs' property rights, which, however, is not necessarily inefficient. Codetermination can be seen as a safeguard against opportunistic exploitation of employees' specific investments. Employers then would have a self-interest in legal provision of codetermination. The paper analyzes four different institutional arrangements, distinguishing whether employers or employees decide if codetermination is established, and which party is to bear the costs of codetermination. According to the model, it can be efficient that employees decide to introduce codetermination, whereas the employers have to bear the costs.

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Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2000-01.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200001

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Keywords: Codetermination; ex-post opportunism; safeguards;

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