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Voting Transparency and Conflicting Interests in Central Bank Councils

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  • Hahn, Volker
  • Gersbach, Hans

Abstract

This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central bankers take into account the fact that they might not be re-elected. Thus, the publication of voting records is beneficial since the government can distinguish central bankers in terms of their preferences and can align the central bank council's preferences with those of the general public over time by means of its re-election decisions. -- In diesem Papier wird untersucht, ob die Veröffentlichung über das individuelle Abstimmungsverhalten von Zentralbankratsmitgliedern sozial wünschenswert ist, wenn diese unterschiedliche Präferenzen haben. Wir zeigen, dass eine falsche Darstellung ihrer Präferenzen für die Mitglieder des Zentralbankrats nicht vorteilhaft ist, auch wenn die Zentralbankratsmitglieder berücksichtigen, dass sie vielleicht nicht wiedergewählt werden. Die Veröffentlichung der Abstimmung ist somit nützlich, weil die Regierung die unterschiedlichen Präferenzen der Zentralbankratsmitglieder im Lauf der Zeit mit denen der Öffentlichkeit durch entsprechende Entscheidungen in Bezug auf die Wiederwahl von Zentralbankratsmitgliedern in Einklang bringen kann.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre in its series Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies with number 2001,03.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:4149

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Cited by:
  1. Seth B. Carpenter, 2004. "Transparency and monetary policy: what does the academic literature tell policymakers?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-35, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  2. Gruner, Hans Peter, 2002. "How much should central banks talk?: A new argument," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 195-198, October.
  3. Mariusz Jarmuzek & Lucjan T. Orlowski & Artur Radziwill, 2004. "Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0281, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  4. Pérez Quirós, Gabriel & Sicilia, Jorge, 2002. "Is the European Central Bank (and the United States Federal Reserve) predictable?," Working Paper Series 0192, European Central Bank.
  5. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
  6. Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2007. "How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 471-484, September.
  7. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "On the Optimality of Decisions made by Hub-and-Spokes Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 027, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.

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