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Free Internet Access and Regulation

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Author Info
Bipasa Datta
Huw Dixon

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Abstract

In this paper we consider the impact of the regulation of telephony on Haan's [2001] analysis of the economics of free internet access. Haan considers an unregulated market, and finds that free internet access is compatible with an efficient outcome and avoids the double marginalization problem. We find that if there is binding price cap regulation, then free internet access is never efficient: ISP access charges will be strictly positive. This suggests that either price-cap regulation is non-binding in the ISP access market, or that some other explanation is required.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 03/03.

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Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:03/03

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.

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