Free Internet Access and Regulation
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Abstract
In this paper we consider the impact of the regulation of telephony on Haan's [2001] analysis of the economics of free internet access. Haan considers an unregulated market, and finds that free internet access is compatible with an efficient outcome and avoids the double marginalization problem. We find that if there is binding price cap regulation, then free internet access is never efficient: ISP access charges will be strictly positive. This suggests that either price-cap regulation is non-binding in the ISP access market, or that some other explanation is required.Download Info
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 03/03.
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Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:03/03
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Related research
Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2003-03-03 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2003-03-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2003-03-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2003-03-09 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2003-03-03 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2003-03-03 (Network Economics)
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