You play (an auction) only once
Abstractconsider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then, regardless of the players' preferences, for each player to mix uniformly in each round over his remaining strategies consitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 97-10.
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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