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Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?

Author

Listed:
  • Marta Curto‐Grau

    (IEB, Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Albert Solé‐Ollé

    (IEB, Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Pilar Sorribas‐Navarro

    (IEB, Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co‐partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about their chances of re‐election. To do so, we draw on data detailing capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during the period 1995‐2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that, on average, a mayor belonging to the same party as that of the regional president obtains nearly twice the amount in grants as is received by a mayor belonging to an opposition party. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears in the case of highly competitive elections. The effects estimated by difference‐in‐differences are not so great but they point in the same direction. Overall, the results are consistent with predictions that regional incumbents focus on obtaining the most votes possible when elections are strongly contested, while they seek to increase the number of aligned mayors when their position at the ballot box is not vulnerable.

Suggested Citation

  • Marta Curto‐Grau & Albert Solé‐Ollé & Pilar Sorribas‐Navarro, 2017. "Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?," Working Papers XREAP2017-05, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Nov 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:xrp:wpaper:xreap2017-05
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    File Function: Revised version, 2017
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    Cited by:

    1. Carozzi, Felipe & Repetto, Luca, 2019. "Distributive politics inside the city? The political economy of Spain's Plan E," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 85-106.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political parties; intergovernmental transfers; distributive politics; regression discontinuity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C2 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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