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Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a "Liberal" Central Banker

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Author Info
Johan Lagerlöf

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Abstract

This paper studies an extension of Rogoff (1985) where the central banker can choose how much effort to exert and thereby learn about a supply shock. With this assumption, it is not necessarily optimal for society to delegate to a "conservative" banker. This may explain why such delegation often is a politically controversial issue.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Kostenverursachende Informationsbeschaffung und Delegation an einen "liberalen" Zentralbankier)
Der Aufsatz befaßt sich mit einer Erweiterung der Arbeit von Rogoff (1985), in welcher ein Zentralbankier darüber entscheidet, wieviel Anstrengung er unternehmen möchte, um Informationen über einen Angebotsschock zu erhalten. Ausgehend von dieser Annahme ist es nicht notwendigerweise optimal für die Gesellschaft an einen "konservativen" Zentralbankier zu delegieren. Dies erklärt unter Umständen, warum Delegation oft ein politisch kontroverses Thema ist.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) in its series CIG Working Papers with number FS IV 99-18.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1999
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Publication status: Published in Economics & Politics, Vol. 13(3), 2001, pp. 221-236.
Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv99-18

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