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Economics and Cognitive Science

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Author Info

  • Douglass C. North

    (Washington University)

Abstract

The neo-classical approach to analyzing the performance of an economy assumes that in the face of pervasive scarcity individuals make choices reflecting a set of desires, wants or preferences. But valuable as this model has been for the development of an elegant body of theory it is a very imperfect tool for solving economic problems both at a moment of time but particularly over time. The puzzle I seek to unravel is how do humans evolve and believe in theories in the face of uncertainty.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Economic History with number 9612002.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 05 Dec 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpeh:9612002

Note: Type of Document - Word; prepared on PC;print on HP Laser; 8 pages
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: cognitive uncertainty development;

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Cited by:
  1. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining," Experimental 9905001, EconWPA.
  2. Olsson, Ola, 2000. "A Microeconomic Analysis of Institutions," Working Papers in Economics 25, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

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