Win Stay---Lose Shift: An Elementary Learning Rule for Normal Form Games
AbstractIn this paper we study a simple learning paradigm for iterated normal form games in an evolutionary context. Following the decision theoretic concept of satisficing we design players with a certain aspiration level. If their payoff is below this level, they change their current action, otherwise they repeat it. We consider stochastic generalizations of this win stay---lose shift principle that average the received payoff over several rounds of the game before comparing it to their aspiration level and allow the strategies to adapt their aspiration level in the course of the play. Our analysis is twofold. On the one hand we study the evolution of such strategies for the Prisoner's Dilemma; on the other hand we consider contexts where a randomly selected game is assigned to the players. In the presence of such high uncertainty win stay---lose shift strategies turn out to be very successful. Using computer simulations we address questions as: what is a favorable aspiration level? How many rounds should one observe before updating the current action? What is the impact of noise?
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Santa Fe Institute in its series Research in Economics with number 97-06-056e.
Date of creation: Jun 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
Web page: http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/working-papers.html
More information through EDIRC
evolution; learning; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; genetic algorithms; satisficing;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Timothy Salmon, 2004. "Evidence for Learning to Learn Behavior in Normal Form Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 367-404, 04.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.