Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Endogenous determination of trade regime and bargaining outcome

Contents:

Author Info

  • Robin Naylor

Abstract

We show that whether trade is one-way or two-way depends on wage strategies adopted by trade unions. The union’s wage strategy choices themselves depend upon the conditions under which trade takes place, as well as upon the characteristics of both the labour and the product markets in the trading countries. The impact of economic integration on union choices and therefore upon both labour market and trade outcomes is shown to vary according to the nature of the prevailing trade regime. We generate testable hypotheses and discuss the implications for the development of econometric tests of these hypotheses.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick in its series CSGR Working papers series with number 40/99.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wck:wckewp:40/99

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) University of Warwick Coventry CV4 7AL, U.K.
Phone: +44 (0) 1203 572 533
Fax: +44 (0) 1203 572 548
Email:
Web page: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CSGR/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: International trade; wage bargaining; economic integration.;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Horn, H. & Wolinsky, A., 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies And Incentives For Merger," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 410, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  2. Stewart, M.B., 1989. "Union Wage Differentials, Product Market Influences And The Division Of Rents," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 323, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Noel Gaston & Daniel Trefler, 1994. "Protection, trade, and wages: Evidence from U.S. manufacturing," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 47(4), pages 574-593, July.
  4. Naylor, Robin, 1998. "International trade and economic integration when labour markets are generally unionised," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1251-1267, July.
  5. Naylor, Robin, 1999. "Union Wage Strategies and International Trade," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(452), pages 102-25, January.
  6. Richard B. Freeman, 1995. "Are Your Wages Set in Beijing?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 15-32, Summer.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Sapir, André, 2000. "Who is Afraid of Globalization? The Challenge of Domestic Adjustment in Europe and America," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2595, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. R. Naylor, 2001. "Firm profits and the number of firms under unionised oligopoly," Working Paper CRENoS 200109, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  3. M. Musumeci, 2000. "Innovazione tecnologica e beni culturali. Uno studio sulla situazione della Sicilia," Working Paper CRENoS 200008, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  4. R. Naylor, 2001. "Industry profits and market size under bilateral oligopoly," Working Paper CRENoS 200108, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  5. C. Antonelli & R. Marchionatti & S. Usai, 2000. "Productivity and External Knowledge: The Italian Case," Working Paper CRENoS 200009, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  6. LR. Keller & E. Strazzera, 2000. "Examining predictive models among discounting models," Working Paper CRENoS 200005, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wck:wckewp:40/99. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.