Optimal Team Contracts

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Optimal Team Contracts

Author Info

Andolfatto, D.

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David Andolfatto

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Waterloo, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 9306.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wat:wpaper:9306

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Related research
Keywords: contracts;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal, 1997. "Optimal Team Contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 385-96, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

John Spraggon, 1998. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments as a Solution to Group Moral Hazards," Department of Economics Working Papers 1998-01, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Spraggon, John, 2002. "Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 427-456, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Al Slivinski, 1999. "Team Incentives and Organizational Form," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9916, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Slivinski, Al, 2002. " Team Incentives and Organizational Form," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 185-206. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.

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