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Path Dependence or Convergence? The Evolution of Corporate Ownership Around the World

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Author Info
Andrew J.Y. Yeh () (Reserve Bank of New Zealand)
Steven Lim (University of Waikato)
Ed Vos (University of Waikato)

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Abstract

We offer a theory that sheds light on the current debate over whether the form of corporate ownership converges to the Berle-Means image. Our analytical results are threefold. First, legal rules and firm-specific protective arrangements are complementary. Secondly, corporate ownership patterns can be convergent or path dependent depending on the relative importance of these protective arrangements. We predict, for example, diffuse stock ownership in countries that impose legal limits on blockholders’ power to expropriate minority investor rights. Thirdly, we find that convergence toward diffuse share ownership is a movement towards the social optimum. Our empirical results suggest a case for the co-existence of path dependence and functional convergence (convergence to the diffuse form of share ownership through cross-listings on U.S. stock exchanges that impose more stringent disclosure and listing requirements). These results have implications for the design of executive compensation, the case for institutional investor activism and the proposal to increase shareholder power.

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File URL: ftp://mngt.waikato.ac.nz/RePEc/wai/econwp/0607.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Waikato, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 06/07.

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Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wai:econwp:06/07

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Related research
Keywords: corporate governance; ownership concentration; institutions; quality of governance; path dependence; functional convergence;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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  1. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1788, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  2. Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X, 1996. "The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 1019-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Evangelos Benos & Michael S. Weisbach, 2004. "Private Benefits and Cross-Listings in the United States," NBER Working Papers 10224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-58, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, 2002. "Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?," NBER Working Papers 9380, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
  11. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, 1998. "Law, Finance, and Firm Growth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(6), pages 2107-2137, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Ayyagari, Meghana, 2004. "Does cross-listing lead to functional convergence? Empirical evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3264, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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