AbstractThis survey of the modeling of pretrial settlement bargaining organizes current main themes and recent developments. The basic concepts used are outlined as core models and then several variations on these core models are discussed. The focus is on articles that emphasize formal models of settlement negotiation and the presentation in the survey is organized in game-theoretic terms, this now being the principal tool employed by analyses in this area, but the discussion is aimed at the not-terribly-technical non-specialist. The survey also illustrates some of the basic notions and assumptions of information economics and of (cooperative and noncooperative) game theory.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0808.
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, 2010. "How Amsterdam got fiat money," Working Paper 2010-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Morten L. Bech & Enghin Atalay, 2008.
"The topology of the federal funds market,"
354, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Bech, Morten L. & Atalay, Enghin, 2010. "The topology of the federal funds market," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(22), pages 5223-5246.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.