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Settlement

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Author Info
Andrew F. Daughety () (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)
Jennifer F. Reinganum () (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)

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Abstract

This survey of the modeling of pretrial settlement bargaining organizes current main themes and recent developments. The basic concepts used are outlined as core models and then several variations on these core models are discussed. The focus is on articles that emphasize formal models of settlement negotiation and the presentation in the survey is organized in game-theoretic terms, this now being the principal tool employed by analyses in this area, but the discussion is aimed at the not-terribly-technical non-specialist. The survey also illustrates some of the basic notions and assumptions of information economics and of (cooperative and noncooperative) game theory.

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File URL: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu08-w08.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University in its series Working Papers with number 0808.

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Date of creation: May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0808

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Postal: Box 1819, Station B, Nashville, TN 37235
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Web page: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/econ/
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Related research
Keywords: Settlement bargaining;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.

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