Monopolistic Competition and Supply-Side Cost Sharing in the Physician Services Market
AbstractThe interaction of insurance and the market for physician services is considered in a model where imperfectly informed consumers rely on doctors for advice on the utilization of services and there is monopolistic competition among physicians on the basis of price and the quality of their advice. Equilibria under fee for service and capitation are compared, and I analyze the use of a system of capitation and partial supply-side cost sharing to attain an outcome superior to either pure fee for service or pure capitation.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics in its series UWO Department of Economics Working Papers with number 9705.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Reference Centre, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/research/research_papers/department_working_papers.html
INSURANCE; MONOPOLIES; COMPETITION; HEALTH SERVICES; SUPPLY;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mingshan Lu & Ching-to Albert Ma & Lasheng Yuan, 2000.
"Risk Selection and Matching in Performance-Based Contracting,"
0101, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Mingshan Lu & Ching-to Albert Ma & Lasheng Yuan, 2003. "Risk selection and matching in performance-based contracting," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(5), pages 339-354.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.