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Monopolistic Competition and Supply-Side Cost Sharing in the Physician Services Market

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Author Info

  • Blomqvist, A.

Abstract

The interaction of insurance and the market for physician services is considered in a model where imperfectly informed consumers rely on doctors for advice on the utilization of services and there is monopolistic competition among physicians on the basis of price and the quality of their advice. Equilibria under fee for service and capitation are compared, and I analyze the use of a system of capitation and partial supply-side cost sharing to attain an outcome superior to either pure fee for service or pure capitation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics in its series UWO Department of Economics Working Papers with number 9705.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9705

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Reference Centre, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/research/research_papers/department_working_papers.html

Related research

Keywords: INSURANCE; MONOPOLIES; COMPETITION; HEALTH SERVICES; SUPPLY;

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Cited by:
  1. Mingshan Lu & Ching-to Albert Ma & Lasheng Yuan, 2000. "Risk Selection and Matching in Performance-Based Contracting," Papers 0101, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.

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