Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Expectations and Comparative Arbitration Institutions

Contents:

Author Info

  • David Dickinson

Abstract

Arbitration is a growing method of resolving disputes in varied settings. While two specific arbitration rules dominate in practice, other procedures have been hypothesized to better promote voluntary settlement. Such hypotheses require theoretical assumptions of identical bargainer expectations even though divergent expectations or optimism is considered prevalent in naturally occurring negotiations. This article examines disputant behavior in a controlled laboratory setting where point-estimates of disputant expectations are captured, thus allowing one to test the “chilling effect” hypotheses of optimism on both dispute rates and final- offer divergence. The extent of the dual chilling effect is examined for both commonly used arbitration procedures as well as for an innovative procedure that, while not used in practice, is theoretically predicted to induce final-offer convergence when expectations are unbiased. The results show that optimism is prevalent in the data, extra information does not fully de-bias the disputants, and optimism increases both dispute rates and final- offer divergence. The degree to which a final offer plays a strategic role in the arbitration institution is an important determinant of this final chilling effect result. Lastly, once the effects of optimism are considered, the innovative arbitration procedure actually generates the highest dispute rates, contrary to its theoretical claim.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: ftp://repec.bus.usu.edu/RePEc/usu/pdf/ERI2003-02.pdf
File Function: First version, 2003
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Utah State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003-02.

as in new window
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:usu:wpaper:2003-02

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://apec.usu.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. David Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt, 2010. "Nonbinding recommendations: the relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 615-634, October.
  2. David Dickinson, 2004. "Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 04-19, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usu:wpaper:2003-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John Gilbert).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.