"Need to Know" Versus "Spread the Word": Collective Action in the Multi-Player Electronic Mail Game
AbstractAs shown by Rubinstein (1989, AER), in the two-player electronic mail game, players are better off if the extent to which they can check each other’s information, check each other’s information about each other’s information, etc., is limited. This paper investigates to what extent this result extends to the multi-player electronic mail game. It is shown that, contrary to the two-player game, the multi-player game has a plethora of equilibria. If players play inefficient equilibria where they require a specific communication network to be established in order to achieve collective action, then Rubinstein’s results extend. However, contrary to the two-player game, the multi-player game also has equilibria where players find many alternative communication networks sufficient to undertake collective action. If players play such equilibria, then contrary to what is the case in the two-player electronic mail game they can become better off with more information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 08-31.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2008-11-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2008-11-04 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-11-04 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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