Patentes, regulación de precios e innovación en la industria farmacéutica
AbstractThe trade-off between property rights/price regulation and innovation depends on country characteristics and drug industry specificities. Access to drugs and innovation can be reconciled by seven ways that, among others, include: public health strengthening in the countries with the largest access problems (those among the poor with the weakest institutions); public and private aid to make attractive R&D on neglected diseases; price discrimination with market segmentation; to require patent owners to choose either protection in the rich countries or protection in the poor countries (but not both). Regarding price regulation, after a review of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, seven strategies to reconcile health and industrial considerations are outlined, including: mitigation of the medical profession dependence on the pharmaceutical industry; consideration of a drug as an input of a production process; split drug authorization from public funding decisions; establish an efficiency minimum for all health production inputs; and stop the European R&D hemorrhagia.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 754.
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
I+D farmacéutico; acceso a medicamentos; patentes; regulación de precios; política industrial; política sanitaria;
Other versions of this item:
- Vicente Ortún, 2004. "Patentes, regulación de precios e innovación en la industria farmacéutica," Working Papers, Research Center on Health and Economics 754, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
- P35 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-05-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-05-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EDU-2004-05-26 (Education)
- NEP-MIC-2004-05-26 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Danzon, Patricia M & Chao, Li-Wei, 2000. "Does Regulation Drive out Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 311-57, October.
- Danzon, Patricia M. & Chao, Li-Wei, 2000. "Cross-national price differences for pharmaceuticals: how large, and why?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 159-195, March.
- Danzon, Patricia M. & Towse, Adrian, 2003. "Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents," Working paper 258, Regulation2point0.
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