We revisit the ubiquitous claim that aiding civil society improves institutional outcomes. In our model, a vibrant civil society initiates public debate in a reform process that would otherwise be dominated by partisan interest groups and politicians. By altering the incentives of interest groups submitting institutional reforms, civil society involvement sometimes solves adverse selection problems that arise because interest groups are better informed than politicians. Because aid increases the cost to the politician of excluding civil society, it affects institution-building. We show that the welfare implications of fostering civil society critically depend on the specifics of local politics, thereby casting new light on the experience of civil society aid in post-communist and developing countries. Our analysis uncovers a particularly disturbing instance of the tragedy that aid can be counter-productive where institutions are poor. An empirical application shows how the impact of civil society aid varies with the level of democracy.
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Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics in its series Electronic Working Papers with number
08-002.
Length: 56 pages Date of creation: Jul 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:umd:umdeco:08-002
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations P50 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
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