Sharing the Income of a Museum Pass Program
AbstractMuseum passes which give visitors access to several museums, are becoming more and more frequent. One of the problems encountered is the sharing of the proceeds. We recommend a fair and easily implementable sharing rule that takes into account the relative contribution of each individual museum to the joint pass program. This rule is based on theoretical arguments drawn from the field of game theory. We also show that other commonly used rules may lead to counterintuitive and inconsistent results, or provide bad incentives. © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/99272.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Museum Management and Curatorship (2001) v.19 nÂ° 4 SUPPL. 1,p.371-383
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