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National Champions and the Two-Thirds Rule in EC Merger Control

Author

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  • Andrew Scott

    (Centre for Competition Policy and The Norwich Law School, University of East Anglia)

Abstract

The 'two-thirds rule' stands as a caveat to the quantitative jurisdictional thresholds stipulated in the Merger Regulations. It prevents the attribution of a 'Community dimension' to large business mergers where two-thirds of the parties' respective turnovers are made in one and the same member state. It sees the relevant national authority and not the European Commission enjoy competence to assess the competitive effects of such a transaction. In the immediate aftermath of Gas Natural/Endesa - a case which the European Commission accepted only reluctantly did not possess a Community dimension - the Competition Commissioner mooted the legislative repeal of the two-thirds rule. The reception by member states of a proposal on these lines is unlikely to be uniformly generous. This note first reviews the origins and content of the two-thirds rule, before proceeding to consider the current momentum behind and prospects for successful reform. It suggests that a wider rapprochement between divergent perspectives on the best approach to achieving economic development both within and across the member states of the EC – and in particular on the problematic issue of support for 'national champions' – will likely be necessary before any revision can occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Scott, 2006. "National Champions and the Two-Thirds Rule in EC Merger Control," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2006-06, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  • Handle: RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2006_06
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    Cited by:

    1. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Würde eine unabhängige europäische Wettbewerbsbehörde eine bessere Wettbewerbspolitik machen?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 78, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    EC Law; Mergers; Jurisdiction; Industrial Policy; National Champions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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