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Correcting for Transitory Effects in RCTs: Application to the RAND Health Insurance Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Kevin Devereux
  • Mona Balesh Abadi
  • Farah Omran

Abstract

The long run price elasticity of healthcare spending is critically important to estimating the cost of provision. However, temporary randomized controlled trials may be confounded by transitory effects. This paper shows evidence of a 'deadline effect' – a spike in spending in the final year of the program – among participants of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, long considered the definitive RCT in the field. The deadline effect is economically and statistically significant, with power to identify coming from random allocation to three- or five-year enrolment terms. The deadline effect interacts with the price elasticity: participants who face lower coinsurance rates show larger spending spikes. Crucially, controlling for the price-deadline interaction yields significantly smaller estimates of the price elasticity in non-deadline years, which we argue is a better approximation for the long run elasticity. This has important implications for public finance and the design of private/temporary subsidy programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin Devereux & Mona Balesh Abadi & Farah Omran, 2019. "Correcting for Transitory Effects in RCTs: Application to the RAND Health Insurance Experiment," Working Papers 201910, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:201910
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/10635
    File Function: First version, 2019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Health insurance; Moral hazard; Public health; RCTs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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