Imperfect Eco-labeling Signal in a Bertrand Duopoly
AbstractIn a Bertrand duopoly model, we study firms’ eco-labeling behavior when certification process imperfectly signals environmental product quality to consumers. The test is noisy in the sense that brown products may be labeled while green products may not. We study how strategic interaction shapes firms’ incentives to get certified, equilibrium demand, prices and social welfare. We find that the eco-labeling policy is welfare enhancing for all parameter values. Nevertheless, the separating testing equilibrium may be too costly to sustain when the green firm probability to pass the test is small. Moreover, if the certification technology is soft, meaning that both brown and green units are awarded the label with high probability, it would be easier to sustain a separating equilibrium. This is a consequence of price strategic interaction between firms that gives firms incentives to coordinate on a separating equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada in its series DEA Working Papers with number 62.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Imperfect Certification; Eco-label; Duopoly; Welfare Analysis; Environmental Quality; Credence Attribute;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2013-10-05 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2013-10-05 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2013-10-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-10-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENV-2013-10-05 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-IND-2013-10-05 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MKT-2013-10-05 (Marketing)
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