Why Green Parties Should Fear Successful International Climate Agreements
AbstractIn recent years, differences between traditional and green parties have been leveled with respect to climate protection. We show that this convergence in party platforms can be explained by successful international climate agreements. We set up a voting model where political parties differ in their preferences for climate protection and where climate protection causes both resource costs and distortions in the international allocation of production. Successful international agreements, which increase climate protection, reduce effective abatement costs and affect traditional parties in a different way than green parties, since a lower preference for climate protection implies a higher price (cost) elasticity of demand. Furthermore, we point out that increasing flexibility and efficiency in abatement mechanisms is preferable to forming a climate coalition that focuses directly on emission reduction commitments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz in its series TWI Research Paper Series with number 56.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Climate Protection; Political Economy; Platform Convergence;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-10-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2010-10-02 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-10-02 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-10-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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