In this paper I try to substantiate the thesis that Jevons may have been too harsh on the vices of induction and generously optimistic about the virtues of deduction, as discussed, primarily, in his magnum opus, The Principles of Science [6]. With this aim in mind the paper attempts to suggest (modern), recursion theoretic, theoretical technologies that could reduce and, under conditions that I claim would be acceptable to Jevons, even eliminate the inductive indeterminacies that he had emphasised.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Find related papers by JEL classification: B16 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Quantitative and Mathematical B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Bayesian Analysis C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computational Techniques
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: