Yvan Lengwiler (University of Basel, Dept. of Economics (WWZ), Petersgraben 51, CH–4003 Basel, Switzerland. yvan.lengwiler@unibas.ch) Elmar Wolfstetter (Humboldt University at Berlin, Institute of Economic Theory I, Spandauer Str. 1, D–10178 Berlin, Germany. elmar.wolfstetter@rz.hu-berlin.de)
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We review different kinds of corruption that have been observed in procurement auctions and categorize them. We discuss means to avoid corruption, by choice of preferable auction formats, or with the help of technological tools, such as secure electronic bidding systems. Auctions that involve some soft elements, such as complex bids consisting of technical and financial proposals, are particularly prone to corruption. We do not believe that it is possible to eradicate corruption altogether in such situations, but we discuss means to make it less likely.
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Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number
90.