Regulating a multiproduct and multitype monopolist
AbstractI study the optimal regulation of a firm producing two goods. The firm has private information about its cost of producing either of the goods. I explore the ways in which the optimal allocation differs from its one dimensional counterpart. With binding constraints in both dimensions, the allocation involves distortions for the most efficient producers and features overproduction for some less efficient types.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 397.
Date of creation: 15 Mar 2013
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2013-03-30 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2013-03-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-03-30 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IND-2013-03-30 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2013-03-30 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2013-03-30 (Regulation)
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