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Prizes and Lemons: Procurement of Innovation under Imperfect Commitment

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  • Ding, Wei
  • Wolfstetter, Elmar G.

Abstract

The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest. We compare ?xed-prize tournaments with and without entry fees, and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement. Our main result is that the optimal ?xed-prize tournament is more pro?table than the optimal auction since preventing bypass is more costly in the optimal auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Ding, Wei & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2009. "Prizes and Lemons: Procurement of Innovation under Imperfect Commitment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 262, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:262
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    Cited by:

    1. Moraga-González, José L. & Sándor, Zsolt & Wildenbeest, Matthijs R., 2014. "Prices, Product Differentiation, And Heterogeneous Search Costs," IESE Research Papers D/1097, IESE Business School.
    2. José Luis Moraga-González & Zsolt Sándor & Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, 2017. "Prices and heterogeneous search costs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 125-146, March.
    3. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    4. Schmutzler, Armin & Letina, Igor, 2015. "Designing Innovation Contests for Diversity," CEPR Discussion Papers 10736, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Igor Letina & Armin Schmutzler, 2019. "Inducing Variety: A Theory Of Innovation Contests," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1757-1780, November.
    6. Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Innovation contests with entry auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 165-176.
    7. Peter Adjei‐Bamfo & Hadrian Geri Djajadikerta & Ferry Jie & Kerry Brown & Reza Kiani Mavi, 2023. "Public procurement for innovation through supplier firms' sustainability lens: A systematic review and research agenda," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 387-407, January.
    8. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis," DFAEII Working Papers 1988-088X, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
    9. José L Moraga-González & Zsolt Sándor & Matthijs R Wildenbeest, 2021. "Simultaneous Search for Differentiated Products: The Impact of Search Costs and Firm Prominence," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(635), pages 1308-1330.
    10. Słomczyński, Wojciech & Życzkowski, Karol, 2012. "Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 94-101.
    11. Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2013. "Auctions with contingent payments — An overview," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 666-675.
    12. Moraga-González, José-Luis & Sun, Yajie, 2022. "Product Quality and Consumer Search," CEPR Discussion Papers 14669, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Anthony Niblett, 2017. "On the efficiency of the common law: an application to the recovery of rewards," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 393-417, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    innovation; contests; tournaments; auctions; bargaining; adverse;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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