The Effect of Bank Competition on the Bankâ€™s Incentive to Collateralize
AbstractIt has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situations where they are better able to evaluate a projectâ€™s risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bankâ€™s choice between screening and collateralization in a model where banks do not have this superior screening skill. In particular, we study the effect of bank competition on this choice. We find that competing banks use collateral less often than a monopolistic bank because competition will intensify if both banks collateralize. Moreover, bank competition is welfare improving if collateralization is rather costly.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 216.
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
collateralization; screening; incentives; bank competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2007-09-30 (Banking)
- NEP-BEC-2007-09-30 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-09-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2007-09-30 (Law & Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.