The Non-Robustness of the Nash-Stackelberg Equilibrium
AbstractFor a simple, standard sequential search model, the Nash-Stackelberg-Hybrid Equilibrium is shown to be non-robust when the assumption that all firms are constrained to operate the outlet is dropped. Firms open additional outlets to increase market power.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, La Trobe University in its series Working Papers with number 1997.15.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
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- Stahl, Dale O., 1996. "Oligopolistic pricing with heterogeneous consumer search," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 243-268.
- Stahl, Dale O, II, 1989. "Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 700-712, September.
- West, Douglas S, 1992. "An Empirical Analysis of Retail Chains and Shopping Center Similarity," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 201-21, June.
- Prentice, David & Sibly, Hugh, 1996. "A Search-Theoretic Interpretation of Multi-outlet Retailers," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 72(219), pages 359-69, December.
- Rob, Rafael, 1985. "Equilibrium Price Distributions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 487-504, July.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1987. "Competition and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive than Atomistic Markets?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 1041-61, October.
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