Coordination in the Labor Market
AbstractWe solve the equilibrium market structure in a labor market where vacancies and unemployed workers can meet either in an intermediated market where wages are determined by take-it-orleave- it offers, or in a directed search market where firms post wages. By using an intermediary agents avoid the coordination problem which prevails in the search market. We study a monopolistic intermediary and perfect competition between intermediaries, and we consider the welfare properties of an intermediary institution, compared to an economy with an uncoordinated search process only.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 64.
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
intermediary; matching; labor market;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2011-05-14 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-LAB-2011-05-14 (Labour Economics)
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