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The inefficiency of the ECPR Yet Again: A Reply to Larson

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Author Info
White, L.J.
Economides, N.

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Abstract

The remainder of this reply will proceed as follow: Section II will again lay out the simple intuition of the ECPR. Section III will reprise our model and its insights. section IV wil summerize Larson's critique. Section V will provide our response. Section IV will address some global issues with respect to oue differences with Larson. An sction VII will offer a bief conclusion.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 96-07.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:96-07

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Postal: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
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Keywords: PRICING; REGULATION;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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  1. Lawrence J. White, 2003. "The "Efficient Component Pricing Rule" (ECPR): A Generally Inefficient Solution to the Access Problem," Working Papers 03-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nicholas Economides, 2004. "Competition Policy In Network Industries: An Introduction," Industrial Organization 0407006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Joyce Sadka. Jose Luis Negrin, 2004. "Full vs. Light-Handed Regulation of a Network Industry," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 257, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Joyce Sadka & Jose L. Negrin, 2004. "Full vs. Light-Handed Regulation of a Network Industry," Working Papers 0403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
  5. Nicholas Economides, 2006. "Public Policy in Network Industries," Working Papers 06-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Joan Calzada & Francesc Trillas, 2005. "The interconnection prices in telecomunications: from theory to practice," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 85-125, June. [Downloadable!]
  7. Nicholas Economides, 1997. "The Tragic Inefficiency Of the M-ECPR," Working Papers 98-01, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Joshy Easaw, 2000. "Network Access Regulation and Competition Policy: An Assessment of the “Direct-Plus-Opportunity Costâ€\x9D Regime and Policy Options," Empirica, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 133-156, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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