Incentives to invest in abatement technology. A tax versus emissions trading under imperfect competition
AbstractIn the longer run, effects on R&D and the implementation of advanced abatement technology may be at least as important as short-run cost effectiveness when we evaluate public environmental policy. In this paper, we show that the number of firms that adopt advanced abatement technology could be higher with emissions trading than with a tax if there is imperfect competition in the permits market. Under perfect competition, the number would always be higher with a tax, given that the regulator is myopic. If we allow for environmental policy response, the ranking is still ambiguous under imperfect competition, while the regimes become equal with perfect competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number 606.
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Auctioned permits; Emissions taxes; technology adoption; Cournot competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2010-01-30 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-01-30 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-01-30 (Regulation)
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