How Special Interests Shape Policy - A Survey
AbstractThis paper surveys recent approaches towards lobbying if interest groups influence the decision of an incumbent government. It describes the two main channels of influence which mainly exist in parallel, namely contribution payments and the transmission of information through lobbying. Recent extensions to the two basic lobbying models are discussed in great detail. Thereafter follows a short overview over current research, which tries to consolidate the two distinct branches of literature into a general lobbying model. The survey concludes with a summary of the main insights and indicates promising directions of further research.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute in its series Working Papers with number 0206.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2002
Date of revision: Jul 2002
lobbying; interest groups; political decision making; contribution payments; information transmission;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
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- Andreas Polk, 2002. "Lobbying Activities of Multinational Firms," Working Papers 0205, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jun 2002.
- Rainer Winkelmann, 2002. "Subjektive Daten in der empirischen Wirtschaftsforschung: Probleme und Perspektiven," Working Papers 0207, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jul 2002.
- Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 2004. "Regulation and Taxation: Analyzing Policy Interdependence," Carleton Economic Papers 04-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Mike Felgenhauer, 2007. "Policy Bias Equivalence under Common Agency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 295-312, April.
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