On the Economics of Integrated Ticketing
AbstractIn this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport network with Cournot duopoly and differentiated demands. We show that whilst firms always prefer to offer integrated ticketing, a social planner will not. With integrated ticketing, the firms always prefer complete collusion but there is not a uniform ranking of some of the less collusive regimes. Society generally prefers the less collusive regimes to complete collusion but prefers some collusion to independent pricing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2005006.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision: Jun 2005
Integrated ticketing; duopoly; collusion.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Systems - - - Government Pricing and Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-03-24 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2007-03-24 (Microeconomics)
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