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On the Economics of Integrated Ticketing

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Author Info
Jolian McHardy () (Department of Economics, The University of Sheffield)
Michael Reynolds
Stephen Trotter

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Abstract

In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport network with Cournot duopoly and differentiated demands. We show that whilst firms always prefer to offer integrated ticketing, a social planner will not. With integrated ticketing, the firms always prefer complete collusion but there is not a uniform ranking of some of the less collusive regimes. Society generally prefers the less collusive regimes to complete collusion but prefers some collusion to independent pricing.

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File URL: http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
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File URL: http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Revised version, 2005
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2005006.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision: Jun 2005
Handle: RePEc:shf:wpaper:2005006

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Related research
Keywords: Integrated ticketing; duopoly; collusion.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
R48 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Transportation Systems - - - Government Pricing; Regulatory Policies

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-7.

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