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An algorithmic solution to the interval Kyoto game

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Author Info
Christophe Deissenberg
George Leitmann

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Abstract

The conference of Kyoto 1997 instutionalized a new and important economic instrument for environmental protection, the Joint Implementation Progran (JI). The concept of Joint Implementation involves a bilateral or multilateral deal in which countries facing high pollution abatment costs invest in abatment in countries with lower costs, and receive credit for the resulting reduction in greenhouse gas emmission. The Technology-Emissions-Means (TEM) model developped by Pickl (1999) aims at embedding the Joint Implementation process into an optimal energy management model that takes into account all relevant technical and financial constraints. Based on this model, we present a new bargaining approach for an efficient international bargaining procedure within the so-called interval Kyoto game.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 with number 312.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf4:312

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Related research
Keywords: Dynamic games; bargaining; Kyoto process; joint implementation; stability of the core;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.


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