This paper examines the welfare implications of managing Q with inflation targeting by monetary authorities who have to "learn" the laws of motion for both inflation and the rate of growth of Q. Our results show that the Central Bank can achieve great success in reducing the volatility of GDP growth with basically the same inflation volatility, if it incorporates this additional target into its policy regime. However, the welfare effects are generally lower, in terms of consumption, when the monetary authorithy reacts to Q growth as well as inflation
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy F37 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation
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