This paper examines the implications of a 'strong' version of bounded rationality popular within computational and evolutionary game theory in which agents are represented by finite automata. It is argued that this view has unrealistic features in that agents of this kind are unable to distinguish between opponent or game types. An alternative view of bounded rationality from social cognition accommodating opponent-specific choices is presented and analyzed by computer simulation.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
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