Bounded Rationality and Social Cognition: A Computational Study
Abstract
This paper examines the implications of a 'strong' version of bounded rationality popular within computational and evolutionary game theory in which agents are represented by finite automata. It is argued that this view has unrealistic features in that agents of this kind are unable to distinguish between opponent or game types. An alternative view of bounded rationality from social cognition accommodating opponent-specific choices is presented and analyzed by computer simulation.Download Info
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Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 with number 172.Length:
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2001
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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf1:172
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Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/conference/SCE2001/SCE2001.html
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Keywords: bounded rationality; social cognition; genetic algorithm;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2001-05-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
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