Social Preferences in Wage Bargaining: a Neocorporatist Approach
AbstractThe starting point in this paper is based on the strand of the literature on corporatist systems stressing the role of co-operation and consensus in wage bargaining in order to reach better economic performances. In order to model a co-operative regime in the classical framework in which the monopoly union controls wages and the firm controls employment, we introduce social preferences with some degree of other-regarding concern(ORC) such that each agent's objective function is a linear combination of her own welfare and the other's. The results show that under specific conditions concerning the degree of ORC, one may obtain an employment level higher than in the selfish case and wage moderation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CELPE - Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy, University of Salerno, Italy in its series CELPE Discussion Papers with number 72.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
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wage bargaining; corporatism; cooperation; social preferences;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-HRM-2011-01-30 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2011-01-30 (Labour Economics)
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