The Agency Model as a Predictor of the Size of the Internal Audit Function in Belgian Companies
AbstractThis study contributes to the literature by using an agency model to explain the size of internal audit functions in a non-Anglo-Saxon environment. Data to test this model were collected from annual reports and a questionnaire sent to Chief Audit Executives. The results show that the agency model has high explanatory power and reveals that the more diffused the ownership structure of the company, the larger the company and the more reporting levels within the company, the larger the internal audit function. The results of this study confirm the growing monitoring role of internal auditing in contemporary corporate governance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium with number 07/458.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
internal auditing; Belgium; agency theory; questionnaire; annual report;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2007-05-26 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-05-26 (Business Economics)
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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