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Auctions versus Negotiations: Evidence from Public Procurement in the Italian Healthcare Sector

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    Abstract

    This paper contributes to the empirical literature on auctions and negotiations. Using healthcare facilities data on procurement contracts, I find evidence that auctions do not yield lower prices than negotiations. This result is robust to specifications tackling quality differences, endogenous participation, and the bilateral and multilateral nature of negotiated procedures. I also find evidence that late payments reduce competition and thus affect firms’ participation choices. A simple test based on Benford’s Law is used to rule out collusion among participants as a possible explanation of the results.

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    File URL: ftp://www.ceistorvergata.it/repec/rpaper/RP191.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series CEIS Research Paper with number 191.

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    Length: 37 pages
    Date of creation: 29 Mar 2011
    Date of revision: 29 Mar 2011
    Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:191

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    Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
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    Fax: +39062020687
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    Web page: http://www.ceistorvergata.it
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    Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
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    Web: http://www.ceistorvergata.it

    Related research

    Keywords: Auctions; negotiations; procurement; medical technology; competition; endogeneity; collusion.;

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