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Dynamic Deterence Theory

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Author Info

  • Leung, S.F.

Abstract

Economic theories of deterrence have primarily been built on static models. A common and serious shortcoming of the existing dynamic deterrence models is the assumption of a two-period structure that ignores recidivism. The aims of this paper are to formulate and solve a general dynamic deterrence model that incorporates recidivistic behavior, to explore its implications, and to derive some testable predictions. The analysis shows how the value and the intensity, engaging in illegal activity change over time, highlights the weaknesses of two-period deterrence models and compares the deterrent effectiveness of increasing the likelihood of punishment versus the severity of punishment. Finally, the recidivistic model provides a structural foundation for the widely used stochastic-process models of crime in operations research and criminology. Copyright 1995 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 366.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:366

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Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: law ; economic models ; crimes;

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Cited by:
  1. Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2001. "Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of Crime," Seminar Papers 696, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  2. Volker Meier, 2001. "On Prison and Therapy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, July.
  3. Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April.
  4. Wang, Shoou-Jiun & Batta, Rajan & Rump, Christopher M., 2005. "Stability of a crime level equilibrium," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 229-244, September.
  5. Alexandre Carvalho & Daniel Cerqueira & Waldir Lobão, 2005. "Socioeconomic Structure, Self-Fuifilment, Homicides and Spatial Dependence in Brazil," Discussion Papers 1105, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
  6. Kenneth Avio, 1998. "The Economics of Prisons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 143-175, September.
  7. Mohamed Jellal & Nuno Garoupa, 1999. "Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning," Economics Working Papers 402, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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