Science and teaching: Two-dimensional signalling in the academic job market
AbstractPost-docs signal their ability to do science and teaching to get a tenure giving universities the possibility of separating highly talented agents from the low talented ones. However separating that means signalling effort for the highly talented becomes even more important in a two-dimensional signalling case. This attracts notice to time constraints. Under weak conditions separating equilibria do not exist if time constraints are binding. The existing equilibria are more costly but without additional information compared to the one-dimensional case. Considering this, the efficiency of the current two-dimensional academic job market signalling can be improved by switching to a one-dimensional one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg in its series Working Paper with number 95/2009.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 10 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Multi-dimensional signalling; Academic job market; Teaching and Research;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-08-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EDU-2009-08-22 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2009-08-22 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2009-08-22 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SOG-2009-08-22 (Sociology of Economics)
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