This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson: Asymmetric Information and Economic Institutions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee)
Abstract

Information for the Public, The Prize in Economic Sciences 2007. Buyers and sellers sometimes haggle too hard and therefore fail to trade. Desirable joint projects are sometimes not undertaken because the projects' beneficiaries fail to agree how the costs should be shared. Sickness insurance, for example, is typically criticized either for offering too little coverage or for inviting misuse. In either case, the basic problem is that people have an incentive to economize with their private information: some insurancy-policy sellers claim that their costs are high in order to increase the price; some beneficiaries of joint projects such as insurance-policy holders claim that their benefits are low in order to reduce their own contributions to the project; some well-insured workers claim that they are sick, in order to reduce their workload.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/info.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Nobel Prize Committee in its series Nobel Prize in Economics documents with number 2007-1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: 15 Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_001

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.nobelprize.org/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

Related research
Keywords: asymmetric information; mechanism design;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.