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Private Information and Client Connections in Government Bond Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Kondor

    (London School of Economics)

  • Gabor Pinter

    (Bank of England)

Abstract

In government bond markets the number of dealers with whom clients trade changes through time. Our paper shows that this time-variation in clients’ connections serves as a proxy for time-variation in private information. Using proprietary data covering close to all dealer-client transactions in the UK government bond market, we show that clients have systematically better performance when trading with more dealers, and this effect is stronger during macroeconomic announcements. Most of the effect comes from clients’ increased ability to predict future yield changes (anticipation component) rather than these clients facing tighter bid-ask spreads (transaction component). To explore the nature of this private information, we find that clients with increased dealer connections can better predict the fraction of the aggregate order flow that is intermediated by dealers they regularly trade with. Positive trading performance is concentrated in those periods when clients have more dealer connections than usual.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Kondor & Gabor Pinter, 2019. "Private Information and Client Connections in Government Bond Markets," 2019 Meeting Papers 126, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed019:126
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    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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