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The Effectiveness of Britain's Financial Service Authority: An Economic Analysis

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  • Colin Beardsley

    ()
    (ICMA Centre, Unversity of Reading)

  • John R. O'Brien

    ()
    (Tepper School of Business, Carnegle Mellon University, USA)

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    Abstract

    Sweeping regulatory reforms in Britain resulted in the formation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA). Because greater transparency of information is a major objective for this Act, shifting from one information system to another has re-distributive effects. We identify these effects at a sector level and their drivers at the firm level. At a sector level, FSA has generally increased the precision of investors’ priors reducing the information risk component of the cost of capital. At a firm level, large firms act as “Stackelberg leaders” in voluntary disclosure games. FSA regulation shifts power from leaders to “followers”.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Henley Business School, Reading University in its series ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance with number icma-dp2004-11.

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    Length: 59 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:rdg:icmadp:icma-dp2004-11

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    Web page: http://www.henley.reading.ac.uk/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Disclosure; Regulation; Game Theory; Stackelberg Leader; Cost of Capital: information asymmetry;

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    References

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    1. David Easley & Maureen O'hara, 2004. "Information and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1553-1583, 08.
    2. Dye, Ronald A, 1986. "Proprietary and Nonproprietary Disclosures," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 331-66, April.
    3. Henry Allen Latane, 1959. "Criteria for Choice Among Risky Ventures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67, pages 144.
    4. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-54, May-June.
    5. Dye, Ronald A., 2001. "An evaluation of "essays on disclosure" and the disclosure literature in accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 181-235, December.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
    7. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 2000. "Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 479-519.
    8. Simon, Carol J, 1989. "The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 295-318, June.
    9. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    10. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
    11. Jackwerth, Jens Carsten & Rubinstein, Mark, 1996. " Recovering Probability Distributions from Option Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1611-32, December.
    12. Colin Beardsley & John R. O'Brien, 2004. "Measuring the Impact of Regulationon Market Stability: Evidence from the US Markets," ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance icma-dp2004-02, Henley Business School, Reading University.
    13. David Easley & Soeren Hvidkjaer & Maureen O'Hara, 2002. "Is Information Risk a Determinant of Asset Returns?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 2185-2221, October.
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