A Model of Strategic Behaviour in Repeated Games
AbstractThis paper develops a general repeated game model over arbitrary time domain (which includes continuous time behaviour). A player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of time. The length of time of commitment depends on the way the history evolves locally. A virtue of this approach is that none of the technical assumptions of the differential formulation (e.g. Lipschitz conditions) are required. In addition, the variable response strategy formulation allows a straightforward discussion of subgame perfection.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 751.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
game theory ; economic models ; economic equilibrium;
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- Klein, Nicolas & Rady, Sven, 2008.
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- Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
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