Nover and Hájek (2004) suggested a variant of the St Petersburg game which they dubbed the Pasadena game. They hold that their game ‘is more paradoxical than the St Petersburg game in several aspects’. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate theoretically and to validate by simulation, that their game does not lead to a paradox at all, let alone in the St Petersburg game sense. Their game does not produce inconsistencies in decision theory.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
5232.
Length: Date of creation: Jun 2006 Date of revision:
Jun 2006 Publication status: Published in South African Journal of Economic & Management Sciences NS9.2(2006): pp. 277-284 Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5232
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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